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Abstract
European Defence Cooperation has in the last few 
years emerged as one of the most dynamic areas of 
European integration, with EU Member States 
increasingly pursuing multilateral security cooper-
ation strategies. Considering Germany’s central 
role in European integration, expectations vis-à-vis 
Germany to contribute more in the realm of the 
EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy to fur-
ther integrate European defence and promote 
increasing defence cooperation among its members 
has also increased. At the same time the election of 
Donald Trump and ‘Brexit’ are cause for greater 
concern regarding the evolution of European 
defence deepening. The article assesses Germany’s 
role in European Defence Cooperation and in par-
ticular the German-French relationship which can 
serve as a ‘defence motor’ if both countries strive 
for more defence integration and a common strate-
gic culture. However, the risk persists that EU 
defence cooperation can go into reverse gear, as in 
this intergovernmental policy domain fleeting 
political will or contingencies of national sover-
eignty continue to shape policy choices of EU 
states.
Resumo
A Defesa Europeia e a Cooperação Alemã em Maté-
ria de Defesa
Nos últimos anos, a cooperação europeia no domínio da 
defesa emergiu como uma das áreas mais dinâmicas da 
integração europeia, com os Estados-Membros da UE a 
perseguirem cada vez mais estratégias multilaterais de 
cooperação em matéria de segurança. Tendo em conta o 
papel central da Alemanha na integração europeia, as 
expectativas em relação à Alemanha para contribuir 
mais no domínio da Política Comum de Segurança e 
Defesa da UE para integrar ainda mais a defesa europeia 
e promover uma maior cooperação na defesa também 
aumentaram. Ao mesmo tempo, a eleição de Donald 
Trump e ‘Brexit’ é motivo de maior preocupação com 
relação à evolução do aprofundamento da defesa na 
Europa. O artigo avalia o papel da Alemanha na Coope-
ração Europeia em Defesa e, em particular, a relação 
franco-alemã que pode servir como um “motor de defesa” 
se ambos os países lutarem por mais integração de defesa 
e uma cultura estratégica comum. Contudo, persiste o 
risco de que a cooperação em matéria de defesa da UE 
possa entrar em processo de marcha atrás, pois, neste 
domínio político intergovernamental, a vontade política 
ou as contingências da soberania nacional continuam a 
moldar as escolhas políticas dos Estados da UE.
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Introduction
European Defence Cooperation has in the last few years emerged as one of the 
most dynamic areas of European integration, with EU Member States increas-
ingly pursuing multilateral security cooperation strategies. Considering Germa-
ny’s central role in European integration, expectations vis-à-vis Germany to 
contribute more in the realm of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) to further integrate European defence and promote increasing defence 
cooperation among its members has also increased (Daehnhardt, 2018). Ever 
since the European Council of December 2013, a renewed impulse was given to 
the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and enhanced defence coope- 
ration among EU Member States. Crimea’s annexation by Russia, the migration 
crisis in Northern Africa and the Middle East, ‘Brexit’, and uncertainty in the 
transatlantic security partnership were additional external drivers of this revita- 
lization. In the face of an incrementally volatile external environment, and with 
the impending exit of the United Kingdom from the EU, the security and defense 
in the EU will decisively depend on Germany and France to jointly further EU 
defence cooperation. 
However, initially Germany did not play a major role in the development of the 
European Security and Defense, in the late 1990s, when the embryonic role of the 
EU as an international security actor was defined by the bilateral relationship 
between France and the United Kingdom, when President Jacques Chirac and 
Prime Minister Tony Blair signed the Treaty of Saint Malo in December 1998, laying 
the foundations for the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). While 
Germany hoped that the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the ESDP’s 
sucessor, adopted with the Lisbon Treaty, in 2009, would play a more decisive role, 
where Germany’s interests and responsibilities would be nested, it contributed 
little to its development, leaving the leading role to France and UK which, through 
bilateral cooperation, and outside the context of the CSDP, signed the Lancaster 
House Accords in November 2010 on cooperation in defense and security policies. 
In a broader context, other weaknesses of the CSDP reflected the lack of strategic 
convergence between the three major Europeans, and the fact that most CSDP 
civilian and military operations were smaller, often symbolic, missions of strategic 
capabilities that could not be an alternative to larger-scale NATO military opera-
tions. European Union defence integration also remained limited as there were 
significant operational constraints on European defence capabilities such as intel-
ligence, reconnaissance, strategic and tactical transport, and the protection of forces; 
the European defense industry remained fragmented and undermined by state 
protectionism and was characterized by the absence of harmonization and stan-
dardized standards (Daehnhardt, 2014). EU defence suffered from duplications and 
excesses in military capabilities, such as personnel, installations and industrial 
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output. This situation was problematic as it overloaded EU member states’ military 
budgets without corresponding operational benefits.
Until ‘Brexit’, then, in the area of  security and defense, the Franco-German relation-
ship was seconded by France’s preference to continued bilateral relations with 
United Kingdom. Thus, in EU security and defense policy, the Franco-German rela-
tionship was traditionally not determinant, because of Germany’s low profile 
commitment to defense issues and insignificant contribution to the European 
Union’s strategic ambition to become a global actor. The Franco-British cooperation 
during the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011, in which Germany abstained in the 
UN Security Council vote, reflected France’s operational preference to cooperate 
with the UK in security and defense issue, even if outside the EU institutional 
framework.
Following the ‘Brexit’ vote and the election of US president Donald Trump, however, 
Germany’s role in European defence cooperation has been elevated to a new posi-
tion, raising the stakes for Berlin to become more actively involved and expecting 
Germany to play a role in security and defence policy more commensurate with its 
geo-economic power (Kundnani, 2011). This article addresses the question of 
Germany’s growing role in European defence cooperation and how Berlin ensures 
a more effective role in an increasingly complex European and transatlantic context. 
The article is divided into four sections. The first section assesses the security impli-
cations of the ‘Brexit’ vote and the Trump election for European security and 
defence; the second section looks at Germany’s position vis-à-vis European defence 
cooperation and sketches out potential impediments for an incrementally more 
active German role. The third section discusses progress achieved by the EU, and 
Germany and France in particular, regarding the recent further deepening of 
defence integration. The final section adresses the issue of a lack of a common stra-
tegic culture as a hindrance towards effective long-term defence cooperation.
Trump, ‘Brexit’ and the Implications for European Security
Much of the analysis on European defence cooperation depends on how one defines 
European defense. If it relates to the European Union’s external security environ-
ment, then to some extent the EU has already become an important security actor, 
despite the somewhat smallness of its CSDP missions and operations. Particularly 
with regard to Northern Africa and the Middle East, it has training and police 
missions in Mali, Central African Republic, Niger, Somalia, Iraq and Libya, it fights 
piracy off the coast of Somalia, it combats terrorism in Mali, and it strives to ensure 
the stability of Europe’s borders, particularly on its southern flank, as a result of the 
mass migration crossing the Mediterranean Sea. 
But if the definition of European security and defence cooperation relates to the 
security relationships among EU Member States then the integration process of 
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European defence cooperation is much slower, despite important progress. For 
while the simultaneity of crises has rendered European defence integration more 
necessary, it has also made Member States more weary of defending their own 
national interests, which at times coincide and at others diverge from those of other 
Member States. 
The accumulation of European crises in the last decade – the crisis of the Euro, the 
crisis of migration, the crisis of European populism and the nexus with illiberal 
democracies – and Russia’s assertive security policy in Ukraine since the annexa-
tion of Crimeia and the civil war in Syria, all represent, in different forms, disrup-
tive factors which highlight the fragility and potential fragmentation of Europe and 
illustrate the need for new dynamics in European security. But it is the recent 
changes in the foreign policies of the United States and the United Kingdom – 
within the inner circle of transatlantic and European alliances – which are cause for 
greater concern regarding the evolution of European defence deepening.
First, the unpredictability of the Trump administration’s foreign policy suggest 
the continuation of the United States’ global strategic repositioning and a more 
transactional approach in its alliance policy, with serious implications for Euro-
pean security. President Trump’s demand that defence budgets of all NATO 
Member States allocate two percent of GDP to defense spending by 2024, while 
not new, suggests, in the terms Trump put it, a new conditionality, that in the 
event of an armed attack, the US nuclear guarantee would only apply to those 
states which had attained the stipulated target. Immediately, the transatlantic rela-
tionship was rendered more conditional, transactional and potentially temporary. 
Admittedly, in NATO’s recommitment to territorial defence following Russian 
aggression against Ukraine, in 2014, the Obama and Trump administrations have 
reinforced the US presence in Eastern Europe by sending a battalion to Poland and 
by creating the European Deterrence Initiative where the US has increased its 
budget.
The two percent defence spending increase becomes even more significant, given 
that Trump has also changed the American position vis-à-vis European integration. 
It was a continuous security interest for all US post-war administrations to support 
European integration as a mechanism for stable relations with and in Western 
Europe and to keep the status quo in transatlantic relations. Breaking with this 
tradition, Trump is the first American president who openly critizices European 
integration, and its preferred multilateralist rules-based approach opts for a deval-
uation of the European Union in US strategy documents and supports ‘Brexit’ and 
populist and nationalist anti-EU-movements. This change suggests the reversal of 
the traditional American position of seeing European integration as supportive of 
the United States’ role as ‘Europe’s American pacifier’ as it was for over 70 years 
(Joffe, 1984). In particular, the US president’s opposition to the European Union is 
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revealed mainly in Trump’s criticisms of Germany’s economic and security poli-
cies: Trump accuses Germany of using the EU as a vehicle to safeguard German 
interests (in a supposedly transactional perspective applied by the US itself), to 
pursue an unfair trade policy towards the US, to be a defence freerider in NATO 
and, finally, to open European doors to Syrian refugees (Deutsche Welle, 2017). 
There is a causal link the analyst Seth Jones (2007) established between Germany 
and the US’s security interests when he stated that “European security cooperation 
is inversely related to American power in Europe: the smaller the US military pres-
ence in Europe, the greater the impetus for European Union security cooperation to 
improve the potential security dilemma. It is also correlated with German power: 
the greater the power of Germany, the greater the impetus for co-operation”. Thus 
there is not only a difficult transatlantic relationship but the dilemma of European 
security persists, and the role of NATO and the EU in this interaction is reduced: 
less US and more Germany are two factors serving as impulse for greater European 
defence cooperation.
Outside the purely transatlantic relationship, Donald Trump’s decision, on 8 May 
2018, to withdraw the United States unilaterally from the nuclear agreement signed 
with Iran in 2015, which lifted sanctions in exchange for suspending Tehran’s 
nuclear program, produced additional implications for the transatlantic relation-
ship, with the US reinstating economic sanctions, and the EU announcing that it 
would maintain its commitment to the agreement with Iran. In September 2018, 
Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, announced the creation of an independent financial mecha-
nism which circumvents Trumps’ warning that the US would target European 
companies which continued to do business with Iran (Financial Times, 2018). While 
this does not produce direct consequences for European defence cooperation, it 
highlights the diminishment of US security interest in Europe. 
Trump’s policies have significant implications for European defence, for while this 
growing estrangement can be a catalyst for reinforcing European defense coopera-
tion, the disruption of the US strategic interest will at the same time foster new 
intra-European divisions as a consequence of a transformed transatlantic relation-
ship. Taken together, these changes in American policy, Jolyon Howorth suggests, 
make ‘the Europeans oscillate between the fear of abandonment and the self-
defeating consequences of bandwagoning’ (Howorth, 2018, p. 18). 
Secondly, uncertainty as to the final outcome of the ‘Brexit’ negotiations – which 
could produce a full UK political and strategic dissociation from Europe or an insti-
tutional separation only with the continuation of a UK-EU strategic link – also 
raises serious doubts about the future of European defence, the cohesion of the 
European Union and the Atlantic Alliance and the potential risk of a division 
between a European continental axis lead by Germany and France and a Anglo-
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Saxonic axis lead by the United States and the United Kingdom (Lain and Nouwens, 
2017). While the departure of the EU’s strongest military power will weaken EU 
defence operationally, Germany and France will gain relative weight in EU defence 
as in a ‘post-Brexit’ EU both will account for almost half of the EU’s combined mili-
tary spending (Konig and Franke, 2017). The agreement to settle the UK’s role in 
EU military operations could, however, provide for the UK to maintain a significant 
linkage through the provision of troops, equipment and institutional compromise, 
including the UK’s participation in the Athena mechanism to co-finance the opera-
tions (Besch, 2018).
In a way not dissimilar to the changes propelled by Trump, the end of the recurrent 
UK veto stance on defense issues can serve as a catalyst towards increased Euro-
pean defence cooperation and strengthen the bilateral security and defence 
cooperation between Berlin and Paris. However, an incremental asymmetry in 
German-French defense cooperation should not be discarded, with inevitable 
implications on EU defence integration (Keohane, 2018; Pannier, 2018).
To the surprise of many, one possible domain where Germany has signalled that 
defence cooperation could be developed with France and the UK is in the realm of 
nuclear weapons capability (Fisher, 2017). A study published in 2017 by the German 
Bundestag scientific group concluded that German and European could co-finance 
the development of foreign nuclear weapons of France and the UK (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2017). This would represent a major shift in Germany’s decades long 
security policy. 
Germany’s Defence Cooperation Capacity
Despite the ongoing momentum for increased European defence integration, there 
are four weaknesses in the German position which have to be addressed as they 
may hinder a more engaged German role in the near future.
First, the desolate state of the German armed forces and capacity deficiencies act as 
an operational brake on deepening German-French defence cooperation, due to the 
lack of operational readiness of the Bundeswehr troops and because of technical 
shortcomings in many of Germany’s Tornado aircrafts or submarines. The problem 
is not so much a shortage of financial resources, despite over two decades of defence 
budget cuts, but rather a misallocation of defense ressources, the irony of which is 
that the procurement budget for weapons and equipment is often not fully spent. 
This is mainly due to an over-bureacratized and understaffed Procurement Office 
and the closing of several manufacturing companies which affects the defence 
supply chain (Buck, 2018).
Secondly, German domestic politics may increasingly limit the grand coalition 
government margin of maneuvrability to engage in staedy defence cooperation. 
Incertainty regarding the future stability of the ‘Grand Coalition’ survival. Not only 
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the unusually long five months to form a new government after the September 2017 
elections, but also recent domestic debacles, such as the Hans-Georg Maasen affair, 
over connections of the spy chief with the far-right (Deutsche Welle, 2018), the 
ousting of Volker Kauder, Merkel’s long standing ally, from His role as chief of the 
CDU parliamentary party (New York Times, 2018) and a continuously disruptive 
“Alternative fur Deutschland” as the second strongest party according to polls in 
September 2018 (Handelsblatt, 2018b). Faced with this instability domestic politics 
may be an increasing brake on Berlin’s capability to act decisively towards further 
European defence cooperation. Although the March 2018 coalition agreement 
emphasis the role of Germany in NATO and transatlantic relations, in defense 
of the EU and the Franco-German relationship, uncertainty about the domestic 
stability of the fourth coalition government renders Defence Minister Von der 
Leyen’s position more difficult, also taking into consideration that the Social Demo-
cratic Party is traditionally averse to defence spending increases. Fault lines 
regarding Germany’s transatlantic policy emerged, with the SPD’s Foreign Minister 
Heiko Maas more critical tone, when he suggested that Europe should emerge as a 
counterweight to the US, while Chancellor Merkel, which finds herself in an overall 
weakened position, has opposed him (Maas, 2018).
Apart from party politics, the German public remains generally averse to interna-
tional military interventions. A survey conducted in May 2014 by the Körber Foun-
dation showed that the majority of Germans approved greater international 
responsibility, but 82% rejected stronger military engagement. Faced with a deci-
sion on the use of force, German decision makers are often faced with a difficult 
trade-off between international gains and domestic losses. In a more recent poll, in 
2017, over 70 per cent of Germans consider the security of Germany and its allies 
the most important role for German involvement in international affairs, but only 
32 percent support an increase in defense spending (Körber Stiftung, 2017). In 
contrast, decisions to intervene militarily and appear as an international crisis 
manager generally increase the approval rates of French presidents.
Thirdly, Germany continues reluctant to politically lead Europe. While it has 
actively responded, together with France, to Russia’s actions in Ukraine, in 2014, 
through economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure, Germany’s leadership to 
uphold the rules-based institutional order, stepping up its contribution to Euro-
pean security structures, preparing the European Union as a global actor in a ‘post-
Brexit’ and post-American-led western world has somehow diminished since 
Angela Merkel’s fourth coalition government came into office. While this has in 
part to do with the difficult post-September 2017 German election negotiations to 
form a coalition government, neither Chancellor Merkel nor Defence Minister 
Ursula von der Leyen have engaged wholeheartedly with French President 
Emmanuel Macron’s new initiatives to revitalize European integration in 2017, and 
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thus have fallen short of co-leading the implementation of new initiatives in the 
security and defence policy. 
Fourthly and finally, the persistence of a sui generis German strategic culture is more 
of a hindrance in European defence cooperation than an enabler. The lack of 
German enthusiasm with assuming a full leadership role in bilateral coordination 
with Paris is (still) explained by the absence of a common strategic culture between 
Germany and France: Germany’s Europeanism (or embedded multilateralism), 
and its culture of political and military restraint stands in opposition to France’s 
emphasis on national sovereignty and strategic autonomy. In Germany the idea of 
strategic autonomy implies military interventionism which post-war Germany 
rejects with the exception of the use of force for humanitarian, crisis management 
or stabilization purposes in out of NATO areas.
Even if since 2014, a security policy based on strategic thinking has gradually 
emerged in Germany corresponding to that of an ordering power in the interna-
tional system, Berlin remains cautious and hesitant about the use of military force 
in international operations (Daehnhardt, 2017). In contrast, France’s defense policy 
has never let go of its inherent Gaullism, and during the transatlantic crisis of 
2002-2003 over the war in Iraq, the French idea of a ‘Europe puissance’ as a counter-
weight to the United States prevailed in much of the French discourse. France and 
Germany have also pursued divergent goals regarding military integration. Even if 
Germany is gradually pulling away from its cautious and hesitant security policy 
towards a more ambitious security and defence policy, as stipulated in its 2016 
White Paper, from the German perspective, an autonomous European intervention 
force presupposes a legally defined institutional framework in accordance with the 
democratic legitimacy the Bundestag expects. Ultimately, these changes in Berlin’s 
position vis-à-vis its security policy do not implicitly mean that Germany’s 
approach will become more like France’s position. Thus while desirable there is no 
automatism in an increasingly German-French approach towards European defence 
cooperation.
German-French Responses: a German-French Defence Motor?
In addressing these shortfalls, both Berlin and Paris accept that a unified Franco-
German leadership is the necessary condition for deeper defence integration 
(Kempin and Kunz, 2017). In all of the EU’s more integrationist moments the 
Franco-German relationship has acted as the indispensable catalyst. In the econo- 
mic and political realm, fifty-five years ago, in 1963, German Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer and French President Charles de Gaulle signed the Treaty on Franco-
German Cooperation, or Élysée Treaty, which became the foundation for the 
German-French partnership. On the 25th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, in 1988, 
both countries signed the creation the German-French Defense and Security Council 
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(Deutsch-Französischer Verteidigungs-und Sicherheitsrat), a political mechanism meant 
to harmonize national security policies and promote defense cooperation and mili-
tary integration in Europe.
Within the bilateral relationship, Germany pursued three objectives. First, the 
German – French bilateralism allowed for the Federal Republic of Germany to 
legitimize its post-war foreign policy. Secondly, it paved the way for an enlarged 
multilateralism in Europe, which became one of the core foreign policy principles 
of the Bonn Republic. Finally after unification, the bilateral relationship helped 
dissuade growing fears of a revival of German hegemony. For its part, France 
followed three objectives. First, to preserve French sovereignty in an intergovern-
mental Europe of sovereign nations. Secondly, to aspire to a French leading role 
in Europe in a Europeanized framework where Paris could exercise coopera- 
tive restraint and curb possible German ambitions. Finally, as from 1993, France 
conceived the European Union as a ‘Europe puissance’ with autonomous defense 
capabilities in a multi-polar world and a Common Foreign and Security Policy 
shaped by French conceptions. 
In the field of foreign and security policy, Germany and France have cooperated 
bilaterally through joint diplomatic efforts to settle the conflicts in Eastern Ukraine 
(e.g. Normandie format and Minsk agreement, February 2015) and Syria, even if 
with little practical results. But with ‘Brexit’ materializing, Berlin and Paris have 
become the indispensable leaders and the backbone of European defense, repre-
senting about 50% of EU military and industrial capabilities after ‘Brexit’. Given 
Germany’s high GDP, it is highly unlikely that Germany will meet the 2 per cent 
clause for defence expenditures by 2024. The proposed increase of 4 billion Euros 
for 2019 would increase the defence budget to 42.9 billion Euros, and would mostly 
be allocated to maintenance and procurement (Helwig, 2018, p. 5). Defence Minister 
Von der Leyen has announced a 1.5% GDP share of defence spending until 2024. 
For Germany this means that if it applied the 2 per cent clause it would become the 
EU’s strongest military power, a circumstance which many provoke more resis-
tance than approval from neighbouring countries as well as its own public opinion.
The Franco-German defence relationship is important for both countries, albeit for 
different reasons. For Germany, the bilateral relationship has always been at the 
heart of its European policy and has effectively functioned as a German-French 
engine to propel further integration. Although this focused mainly on issues related 
to the economic and monetary integration, there was also a defense component, as 
exemplified in the Franco-German Brigade, created in 1987. For France, deepening 
defence cooperation with Berlin remains a priority, given that only Germany has 
the financial resources to invest in state of the art weapons systems. Examples of 
German-French military cooperation include armaments cooperation with 
numerous joint procurement projects and the merger, in 2015, of Germany’s Krauss-
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Maffai Wegmann and France’s Nexter, the two largest tank manufacturers of both 
countries. In addition, for France, Germany’s participation in military operations 
outside Europe to deal with possible security threats has become important to 
counter France’s military overstretch in Africa, as examplified in Mali, where 
Germany is part of a UN peacekeeping force and a EU military training mission in 
support of France’s counter terrorism efforts in response to the terror attacks in 
Paris in November 2015 with about 1,000 troops, and after the French government 
invoked the EU mutual assistance clause (Article 42 (7), TEU).
In the last two and a half years Germany and France have been active in pushing 
forward further defence cooperation among EU Member States. Germany’s White 
Paper 2016 on Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (German Ministry 
of Defense, 2016) published by the Federal Government on 13 July and the “EU 
Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy” served as the basis for furthering 
German-French defence cooperation. The German-French initiative on “Renewing 
the CSDP towards a comprehensive, realistic and credible defense in the EU” 
(German-French Security Initiative, 2016) through the creation of a European Secu-
rity and Defence Union was jointly presented by Ursula von der Leyen and her 
French counterpart Jean-Yves Le Drian on 12 September 2016, and discussed shortly 
after at the informal meeting of EU Defense Ministers on 26-27 September 2016 in 
Bratislava. Creating a Security and Defence ‘Union’ elevates the EU’s level of ambi-
tion considerably, if by “union a multi-national and integrated defence capacity 
enabling the EU to engage in high-intensity military and civil–military operations 
with minimal assistance from the US” is meant, that generates “the type of coordi-
nated and integrated military capacity that currently exists within NATO – but 
under EU institutional mechanisms and with centralised EU military leadership” 
(Howorth, 2018, p. 9).
PESCO and the European Intervention Initiative
Advances in European defence cooperation were reinforced by the election of 
Emmanuel Macron, in May 2017, confirming him as one of the most pro-European 
and pro-German governments in Paris and a president decided on boosting the 
European defense and security policy. In June 2017, the EU instituted the Military 
Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC). However, given that its mandate is 
limited to non-executive (training and capacity-building) military operations 
and more robust executive military operations such as EUFOR Althea in Bosnia 
or EU NAVFOR MED operation Sophia off the coast of Libya are excluded from 
this new institutional structure, the MPCC only functions as a quasi-operational 
headquarters. 
Also at the EU Council in June 2017 the EU created the European Defence Fund 
(EDF) to promote research and development of European technology and defense 
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products to encourage multinational European participation and bridge technology 
gaps, reduce duplication and acquisition of defense capabilities among EU Member 
States. While the European Commission steps up its role in defence matters by 
providing 20 per cent of the funding for research programmes, the total sum allo-
cated by the EDF remains modest. Thus while its constitutes an incentive for 
Member States to collaborate in creating defence synergies, it will still be up to the 
national governments to decide whether such a high investment is worthwhile.
Another step towards increased defence cooperation was the creation of the Coor-
dinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), an intergovernmental mechanism, 
whose effectiveness is dependent on the Member States’ willingness to share their 
national defence plans and where the European Defense Agency produces biennial 
reports on the progress made on how member states coordinate joint capability 
development plans.
But the most significant development was the implementation of the Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO), when 25 Member States signed the treaty and 
agreed on 17 joint projects. While relevant decisions regarding PESCO should be 
adopted in the Fall 2018, in terms of capability developments the seventeen projects 
thus far do not address major capability gaps.
At the EU Council of Ministers on 11 December 2017, 25 Member States joined 
PESCO. The implementation of PESCO – aimed at fomenting capability synergies 
– set off to a bad start as it rests on opposing German and French views: while 
Berlin emphasizes the political integrationist dimension aiming to include the 
highest number of Member States, Paris focuses on the operational efficiency of the 
defence cooperation among only the more capable member states (Biscop, 2018). 
Much of these divergent views are related to the difference in strategic cultures: 
whereas Germany pursues an inclusive multilateralist approach, France believes 
that the strategic autonomy it aims for can only be achieved by a smaller and more 
cohesive group of states, more capable of conducting the sort of military operations 
that such an autonomy entails, and in the geographical areas such a choice allows 
for (Major and Mölling, 2018).
Thus in insisting on ‘strategic autonomy’ France is following up on the EUGS stated 
goal that the EU should achieve strategic autonomy. But France’s idea of strategic 
autonomy and security cooperation is not limited to the EU alone. On 26 September 
2017 President Emmanuel Macron launched the European Intervention Initiative 
(EII) in his speech at the Sorbonne (Macron, 2017). The EII is meant to join European 
states that are militarily capable to project operational readiness to engage in oper-
ations, if necessary, outside the institutional frameworks of the EU and NATO. 
Major and Molling (2017) see this as a clear move “away from an EU-centered 
approach to a European defense approach”, due to France’s threat perception of 
Europe’s southern neighborhood as the most important challenge for its national 
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security, its own military overstretch in the outer-Europe area and uncertainty 
regarding the US’s and UK’s future security policies.
Despite being proposed three months before the adoption of PESCO, many analysts 
see Macron’s EII as the opposite of Germany’s PESCO model as it aims to reinforce 
operational autonomy, through a core group of states, with the ironic side effect 
of involving the UK. But it is not clear that the EII will effectively work, as other 
states may accuse France of selfishly pursuing its own ambitions, particularly in 
Africa. 
With its continuously critical stance regarding military interventions and legal 
constraints, Germany responded hesitantly but joined the French initiative, in order 
to avoid a German-French dissent and also because “amidst a strained transatlantic 
alliance, it became politically very costly for Germany to reject the French offer to 
join (...) [even if] a European hedging strategy is not pursued lightly” by Berlin 
(Helwig, 2018, p. 5). On 25 June 2018 Defence Ministers from France, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Denmark 
and Estonia signed a letter of intent on the EII, “promising to develop a common 
strategic culture, share analysis and predict problems at problematic points may 
require intervention and work to coordinate their forces for future operations” and 
pledging “to consolidate European strategic autonomy and freedom of decision 
and action”.
Macron’s initiative posed a challenge to Germany as, on the one hand, the basic 
idea of  an ‘intervention force’ contradicts Germany’s strategic culture and on the 
other, a force formation outside the PESCO framework would weaken the EU 
project on which Germany established its political capital. Defense Minister von 
der Leyen therefore called for the integration of the intervention force into PESCO 
– a proposal likely to find few supporters in France. Another option would be to 
‘link the EII and the Framework Concept of Nations (FNC), a German idea of  orga-
nizing defense cooperation in Europe’ (Major and Mölling, 2017). Finally, with 
regard to third country participation, the European Intervention Force allows for 
countries like Britain to participate and continue to contribute to the security and 
defense of Europe even after ‘Brexit’. 
But European defence cooperation cannot be dissociated from Europe’s transa- 
tlantic security link with the United States. Germany, together with France will play 
a crucial role to ensure that enhancing European defence cooperation is done in a 
way not to antagonise the US and the UK even more than is already the case. PESCO 
and the European Intervention Initiative have the potential to raise suspicion with 
Washington and London that the EU states want to opt for strategic autonomy 
through a European security decoupled from NATO. Whereas PESCO is about 
developing joint defence capabilities and joint investments, the EII is intended to 
promote joint military interventions abroad.
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In all these initiatives (MPCC, FED, CARD and PESCO), Germany will play a 
central role in the coming years. Since Germany has become one of the main voices 
in the CSDP, the concern for a ‘Germanization’ of European defense characterizes 
the view of other member states on Berlin initiatives: a focus on institutions rather 
than military operations. PESCO, CARD and the European Defense Fund are 
important steps towards a common European defense capability. They aim to maxi-
mize the efficiency of defense spending, improve the competitiveness of the Euro-
pean defense industry and adapt the different technologies. The EU is currently far 
from it. Fragmentation, duplication and protectionism prevail in the European 
defense industry (Drent and Zandee, 2018). In fact, many Member States maintain 
uncompetitive arms industries as government-subsidized job creation schemes, or 
buy off the peg from third countries such as the US. The biggest problem, however, 
is the low level of defense spending in Europe.
Prospects that defence cooperation between Germany and France may increase: the 
proposal to examine the joint production of combat aircraft takes place in the 
context of increased German defense spending. The German government, like all 
other NATO allies, has committed itself to increasing defense spending in order to 
reach the level of two per cent of GDP. In 2017, Germany’s military spending rose 
by 3.5 per cent to 44.3 billion dollars, after a 4.2 per cent increase in 2016 (SIPRI, 
2018). France is already close to that level; with about 1.8% of GDP in defense, while 
Germany spends only about 1.2%. The trend since 2016 of increased spending on 
German defense is likely to continue, which will allow Germany to invest more in 
military procurement (Buck, 2018).
The German and French Defence Ministers signed an agreement at the Berlin Inter-
national Air Show, in April 2017, on high-level requirements for a next-generation 
fighter to be jointly developed by historical rivals, Dassault Aviation and Airbus, to 
replace the French Rafale and pan-European aircraft Eurofighter/Typhoon. At a 
German-French Ministerial Council meeting in Paris, on 13 July 2017, Germany and 
France sent an important signal as they unveiled their intention to develop a joint 
fighter jet aircraft expected to be operational in 2040 to replace the rival Eurofighter 
and Rafale jets. According to Reuters (2017), “Paris and Berlin also agreed to set up 
a cooperation framework for the next model of the Airbus Tiger attack helicopter 
and for tactical air-to-ground missiles. In addition, they will work together on 
procuring ground systems including heavy tanks and artillery and said a contract 
was expected to be signed before 2019 for the military ‘Eurodrone’ project, which 
also includes Italy”.
While these joint capability development projects ensure bilateral defence coopera-
tion between Germany and France, it will only promote real European defence 
cooperation if they will not remain exclusive bilateral endeavours and are at a more 
developed stage opened to other member states joining in (Koenig and Walter-
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Franke, 2017, p. 13). The importance of such a project, as some commentators have 
noted, is that it “is seen as a key indicator for how – and if – Europeans can manage 
a truly large-scale project, especially given industry rivalries that lie beneath the 
often lofty diplomatic language” (Defense News, 2018). 
As for defence spending, Germany and France currently spend roughly the same 
with defense – about 40 billion euros per year. Germany has a larger population 
and a larger GDP. To achieve the two percent spending target, for France this would 
mean an increase of about five billion euros per year. For Germany, this would 
mean an increase of about 25 billion euros per year – a great addition of resources 
that even Germany admits will be tricky to spend wisely. The other part of the two 
percent target is a 20 percent goal in acquiring important equipment as well as in 
research and development. France goes beyond this goal: they spend about 24% of 
their defense spending on equipment and related items. Germany is about 14%. As 
Germany’s overall spending increases, the proportion that is devoted to the acqui-
sition is also likely to increase. But France is disillusioned with the German govern-
ment’s inability to do more to increase the defense budget to over the current 1.2 
per cent of GDP, given its large fiscal surplus and its commitment to move towards 
NATO’s defense spending target of 2% of gross domestic product. Thus it is likely 
that “bilateral defense cooperation between Paris and Berlin will remain compli-
cated and underwhelming” (Kunz, 2018, p. 2). 
The Lacking Common European Strategic Culture
Although often trivialized, one of the biggest problems in the security and defense 
relationship between Germany and France remains the lack of a shared strategic 
culture. While France and the United Kingdom share the same strategic culture and 
a history of projection of military force outside Europe, Germany remains clinged 
to a strategic culture of military reluctance and hesitancy (kultur der zuruckhaltung) 
that makes Franco-German cooperation in defence more difficult. As Koenig and 
Walter-Franke have argued:
“Contrasting views on the legitimate use of force also shape diverging preferences for 
the EU’s role. With its interventionist culture, France views the EU as a multiplier in 
terms of legitimacy and capacity. It has long pressed for Europe’s defence, as well as 
for the EU’s strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. While not opposing the 
idea of  a stronger European defence policy, Germany has advocated a comprehensive 
approach to security at national and EU level and insisted less on strategic autonomy 
from the United States. These differences in strategic culture are firmly rooted in their 
respective political systems. Under the German Constitution, the Armed Forces can 
only be used for defense purposes or in the context of multilateral operations. Whe-
ther the EU qualifies under the second is still subject to legal controversy. In addition, 
the Bundestag must approve any armed intervention by the Bundeswehr. In France, 
the president decides on the deployment of the armed forces. Since 2008, Bundestag 
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approval is mandatory, but only if an operation is extended beyond four months from 
the initial decision. Between 1991 and 2016, the Bundestag voted twelve times more 
in military engagement than the National Assembly.” (Koenig and Walter-Franke, 
2017, p. 8).
German-French differences in strategic culture also act as an obstacle to Franco-
German security and defense cooperation as they often raise mutual suspicion: 
Germans are weary of France’s continuing interventionism in Africa which they see 
as serving the French national interest only, while the French do not understand 
that Berlin continues to abstain from siding with its allies when they launch 
airstrikes in Libya, in 2011, for humanitarian reasons or in Syria, in 2017, against a 
chemical weapons facility. Divergent positions vis-à-vis the arms export policies of 
Germany and France have led Germany’s more restrictive arms export rules to 
countries at war to hinder the sale of jointly produced weaponry, such as the jointly 
produced helicopters to the Gulf states. In addition, “Paris’ visions of strategic 
autonomy for Europe include a strong and solid industrial base of its own in arma-
ments and high technology (…) and government ownership or government 
influence on the defence industry has always been a distinctive characteristic of 
France’s security policy” (Puhl, 2018, p. 3). Thus French policy “prefers dealing 
with a competitive private sector, holding government influence to a low level. This 
always affected and still affects the status and organisation of armaments policy in 
both countries, which, after all, have to take the decisions on the procurement and 
maintenance of military equipment” (Puhl, 2018, p. 3).
Ultimately, for any Franco-German initiative to succeed with long lasting impact, 
each country would need to make concessions vis-à-vis the other, and for that to 
occur, as Jean-Marie Guéhenno (2016) has argued, France has to become more 
German and Germany has to become more French. President Emmanuel Macron’s 
lament that EU needs a ‘common strategic culture in Europe’, as he put it in his 
Sorbonne speech, addresses the issue, but it is likely that Germany will not strive to 
change its own strategic culture to become more French, nor does Macron’s concept, 
or his European Intervention Initiative imply that France’s strategic culture would 
become more German. However, as Daniel Keohane (2018) has argued, EU military 
cooperation should be understood “more in the context of its utility for national 
defense policies across Europe, and less through its relationship with NATO or its 
role in European integration”, as European military cooperation “is mainly driven 
by the merging of national defense policies in various different ways rather than by 
the efforts of European (or transatlantic) institutions”. 
But ultimately, Europe will only begin to be taken seriously as a security actor when 
it begins to develop new operational capabilities and “the ability to protect Euro-
pean interests with European troops, including, where appropriate, intervention” 
(Leonard and Röttgen, 2018). Otherwise, as Hans Kundnani argues, “whether, 
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given that the EU has not evolved into a full political union or becoming indepen-
dent of the United States in security terms, the new doubt about the security 
guarantee could lead to a process of disintegration’ the EU itself” (Kundnani, 2017, 
p. 2). Thus in the long term it seems plausible that “the end state will have to be some 
form of highly coordinated, multi-national, joint and tightly integrated defence 
capacity enabling the EU to engage in high intensity military (and civil-military) 
operations with minimal assistance from the US” (Howorth, 2018, pp. 7-8).
Concluding Remarks
European defence cooperation has in the last few years undergone a new dyna-
mism, with new institutional structures set in place and with the promise for EU 
Member States to proceed with deepening defence integration through creating 
joint procurement initiatives, initiating permanent structured cooperation and 
agreeing to a European defense initiative. While these measures aim to respond to 
growing external challenges, much will depend on the member states continuous 
political willingness to put the projects into effective practice. This is particularly 
pressing with regard to the case of Germany, whose role in European defense in a 
post-transatlantic and ‘post-Brexit’ environment while becoming more visible 
remains constrained by a series of domestic constraints. Germany’s Defense 
Minister Ursula von der Leyen has steered the country in the direction of an increase 
of Germany’s defense expenditures and armed forces modernisation, but the dire 
straits in which the Bundeswehr finds itself as well as the over-bureacratized 
procurement process raise doubts as to how effective Germany’s role will be in the 
medium term (Mölling and Schutz, 2018). In addition, Germany’s position vis-à-vis 
deepening defence integration rests on an inclusive approach which aims to politi-
cally have the largest possible number of Member States aboard, which may slow 
down the integration process as a whole. Ultimately, European defence cooperation 
will only function effectively if Germany works closely together with France, if 
they strive to develop a new approach towards a common strategic culture and if 
both are willing to propose new institutional structures to operationalise the EU’s 
intended strategic autonomy. This could entail the pursuit of a European Security 
Council, a European Security Advisor and the creation of the post of a European 
Defence Minister, with the intent of fomenting trust-creating synergies among 
Member States as well as facilitate the all complex EU-NATO relationship (e.g. 
maritime cooperation in the Mediterrannean is essential).
Over the last five years, since the European Council in December 2013, the Euro-
pean Union has managed to galvanize the ambition to make the EU a credible secu-
rity actor – at least at the level of efforts to create synergies for new projects and 
mechanisms such as PESCO, or structures such as the European Defense Fund. In 
the pursuit of genuine ‘strategic autonomy’ as envisaged by the EUGS, the EU 
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needs a clearly articulated strategy that ensures better coordination between the EU 
and NATO processes – by harmonizing, for example, the CARD and NATO plan-
ning processes to avoid duplication, by outlining objectives in the Southern and 
Eastern neighborhoods, and by reviewing of EU-NATO relations if the EU aims to 
progressively, as some suggest, take the lead in NATO (Howorth, 2018). 
Whether or not ‘Brexit’ will lead the EU to greater defence integration and Euro-
pean strategic autonomy, and enable the EU to tackle more security-related chal-
lenges, for example in the Middle East, more effectively is not certain. Much will 
continue to depend on the Member States willingness to subordinate national 
interests to greater defence integration and, whether there is agreement as to the EU 
stabilization priorization role in its immediate neighbourhood. 
European defence cooperation thus seems to be on the right track. But with the 
weakening of the Anglo-Saxon security link in the Western liberal order, following 
the UK’s disengagement from the EU and the US’s reduced commitment towards 
the European security guarantee, the reforms the EU Member States decide upon 
and the European Commission pursues in European defence need to be based on a 
long term strategy which implements strategic autonomy and consolidates a Euro-
pean perspective of a post-Atlantic world order. This need not be over-ambitious 
but be seen as defence cooperation ‘as good as it gets’, based on bilateral and multi-
lateral compromises whereby most if not all Member States feel that they are pulling 
from the same string. This is where Germany’s role as an ‘embedded multilate- 
ralist’, and compromise-seeking security actor could play a more decisive role in 
European defence cooperation. 
Despite the enormous changes in Germany’s exernal strategic environment, 
there is no viable alternative for Germany’s security and defence policy than 
through the EU. This is not to be done at the expense of weakening NATO, as the 
German government recognizes but through strengthening European defence 
integration.
Ultimately, Germany can indicate it wishes to develop military capabilities like a 
fighter jet or a tank under the heading of PESCO, but at a later stage decide to do it 
outside the PESCO framework. In other words, while the much praised flexibility 
is a necessary mechanism towards greater EU defence cooperation and effective EU 
military capacity, it can just as well go into reverse gear, as any Member State, in 
this intergovernmental policy domain, can always allege fleeting political will or 
contingencies of national sovereignty. Germany, while arguably the most ‘europe-
anised’ of the bigger Member States, is no exception to this.
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